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Abstract
Since 1973, wage and income inequality has increased dramatically in the United States. Workers who
entered the labor market after the 1970s did not experience the same level of economic security as workers
in the 1950s and 1960s during the “Golden Age of Capitalism.” Jobs paid relatively lower wages, there was
less opportunity for collective bargaining, and fewer jobs offered healthcare coverage and pensions. When
earnings increased after 1973, the gains disproportionately accrued to the top earners of the income
distribution while workers at the bottom experienced stagnant and declining real incomes. What economic
factors during the 1970s created a distinct shift towards rising income inequality? Lacking consensus
among scholars, this work historiographically analyzes various explanations put forth by economic
historians and labor economists regarding the origins of income inequality in the United States.
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Introduction: Productivity and Wages
Post-War Leverage: the Keynesian Paradigm
At the conclusion of World War II, the United States became the largest industrial
producer in the world. By war’s end, the U.S. contained over 60% of all capital stock of
the advanced capitalist nations and produced nearly 60% of the world’s total output. The
task of rebuilding the world economy created tremendous aggregate demand
domestically, and the political economy that came to fruition unleashed in the United
States the greatest period of economic growth in history. President Roosevelt’s vision of
a New World Order led to the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 to promote global trade
relations that included the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) that would later become the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Additionally, Roosevelt was instrumental in
chartering the United Nations at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Stability was the
goal, and European nations looked to the United States as the chief operator in achieving
that end.
The onset of the Cold War altered economic incentives towards rebuilding and
stabilizing the economies of allies in Western Europe, even if it economically
disadvantaged the United States. Learning from the economic downturns of the 1930s,
the lack of international coordination during the Great Depression created a consensus
among policymakers that the United States could not prosper in a world of other poor
economies. Additionally, the long-term economic prosperity of the U.S. was in jeopardy
by security issues posed by the Soviet Union in Europe. Under the influence of foreign
policy protocols like NSC-68, the post-war American market became “the Cold War’s

Page |2
incubator for alliance prosperity” that provided the U.S. with significant political
leverage and exclusive access to European markets. 1
The post-war economic boom is unique to American economic history because it
was a period when economic growth soared, income equality increased, and the poverty
rate fell. Categorized by economic historians and labor economists as the “Age of
Compression” (1947-1973), American workers in the post-war labor market experienced
rising real incomes, a narrowing of the income distribution, and a rising standard of
living. An increase in the relative demand for low-skilled labor in the 1940-50s along
with minimum wage increases bolstered incomes at the bottom of the wage distribution.
At the same time, the influx of more skilled workers into the labor market during the
1950s and 60s with the help of the G.I. Bill depressed the price of skilled labor to
conserve the “egalitarian impact of the Great Compression.” 2 From 1947-73, productivity
gains increased disposable incomes by 15% in real terms, boosting the purchasing power
of American workers. Over one-third of the work-force was unionized and enjoyed paid
vacations, healthcare benefits, pensions, and holidays that became associated with the
traditional working-class lifestyle.
Workers who entered the labor force in the 1950s and 1960s reaped the benefits
of their productivity gains. Rising real incomes along with cheaper goods provided the
necessary conditions to increase the country’s standard of living. The application of
mass-production from war materials to consumer goods made products more affordable

Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 7-8.
2
Claudia Golden and Robert Margo, “The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at
Mid-Century,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 1 (February 1992), 32.
1
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to millions of families for the first time in history: “The washing machine, refrigerator,
and vacuum cleaner had come to the working class.” 3 The automobile became more
readily available and affordable to consumers, as car owners increased from 49 million in
1950, 62 million by 1960, and 119 million by 1972. Federal investment in highway
construction with President Eisenhower’s Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 increased
domestic employment and facilitated the migration of middle-class families westward
and into new urban and suburban communities around the nation. Families were able to
purchase homes at affordable prices and relatively low interest rates, which allowed more
Americans to accumulate wealth as real home prices increased. Evidence of rising
incomes at all levels of the earnings distribution produced the wisdom of “a rising tide
that lifts all boats.” This held true during this period from 1947 to 1973, when both
median and mean family income doubled, and the poverty rate decreased by more than
sixty percent. 4
The economic prosperity from the public works projects and successful
government planning further promoted a Keynesian economic philosophy towards
government spending and regulation that lasted into the early 1970s. Post-war economic
success and the relative stability of New Deal programs formed an ideological paradigm
that accepted the need for effective government intervention in the economy. It was
mutually acknowledged during the Age of Compression that the government had
important functions to society that included fair taxation, funding of social programs, and

Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade, 2.
Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, America Unequal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995),
41.

3
4
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aid for employment; the neoliberalist ideal of shrinking the size of government and
cutting taxes did not become a popular mantra until after 1980. 5 During the early postwar period, the ideological consensus behind Keynesian economics was so pervasive
neither conservative Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower nor Richard Nixon made any
significant attempt to dismantle the framework of Roosevelt’s New Deal programs.
According to Judith Stein, the prosperity experienced in the three decades after the war
altered the ideological lens used to analyze society. In academic literature, important
works like John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1957), Daniel Bell’s End of
Ideology (1959), and Gunnar Myrdal’s Challenge to Affluence (1963) argued the historic
conflict between capital and labor had resolved itself and America’s great prosperity
could end poverty in the country. 6 There was a vision of a United States without poverty,
and a belief that public policy was the appropriate avenue to make it a reality.
The movement embodied itself politically in President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great
Society” campaign and “War on Poverty” agenda in the late 1960s. A lens focused on
reducing poverty and investing in education and jobs programs led to the greatest
expansion in social welfare programs since Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation in the
1930s. Legislative achievements include the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Equal Opportunity
Act of 1964, the Head Start Program, and the Social Security amendments of 1965 that
established Medicare and Medicaid. 7 The economic prosperity and success in reducing
the nation’s poverty rate led two key economic advisers to President Johnson, Robert
Judith Stein. Pivotal Decade, 25.
John Kenneth Galbraith, Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); Daniel Bell, End of Ideology:
on the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Gunnar
Myrdal, Challenge to Affluence (New York: Pantheon, 1964).
7
Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, America Unequal, 19-20.
5
6
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Lampan and Jams Tobin, to confidently project the elimination of poverty by 1980. The
1967 Economic Report of the President declared, “The United States is the first large
nation in the history of the world wealthy enough to end poverty within its borders." 8 The
continuation of economic growth was taken for granted because the success of social
programs were based on the premise that high rates of growth would continue. Just as
policymakers began to capitalize on economic growth to tackle poverty and inequality,
the growth suddenly stopped. Seemingly unabated prosperity was put to an end in 1973.
It was not until the early 1970s did the U.S. begin to experience significant economic
downturns. When the troubles arrived, the political and economic fallout dramatically
reshaped policy dogma in the United States and forever transformed the U.S. labor
market.

The U-turn
The post-war economic stimulus remained into the 1960s, but the economic
advantages enjoyed by the United States were temporary. The international landscape
shifted dramatically in the 1970s as Japan and Germany became major industrial
competitors, eventually surpassing the U.S. in productivity growth. “In 1945, U.S.
economic superiority was so vast that one-sided trading policies did not matter. Over
time, they ultimately did. And when high oil prices and economic competition from
Japan and Germany battered the economy in the 1970s…The Age of Compression
officially ended.” 9 Wage growth for American workers began to stagnate after the
consecutive quarterly declines in productivity growth in 1973.

8
9

Economic Report of the President, 16, 1967; Danziger and Gottschalk, America Unequal, 21.
Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade, xi.
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Traditionally, the OPEC Oil Embargo is viewed as the main catalyst for the
productivity downturn. While the United States remained the largest producer of oil in
the world in 1972, making 11.2 million barrels of oil a day, it was also the world’s
greatest consumer at 17.4 million a day. This took place while OPEC nations were
producing around 7 to 8 million barrels a day but consumed relatively little themselves.
With Texas production maxed, oil producers like Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, and Iraq
used their leverage in the oil market to their collective advantage: “This changing
strategic balance allowed the new oil producers to flex their muscles.” 10 Data reveal
rising energy prices coincided with productivity slowdowns in all industries in the U.S.
starting in 1973: “Higher energy prices contributed to inflation….the net results was
higher unemployment and a poorer investment climate, which in turn fed back on
productivity.” 11 Additional research suggests the oil crisis was one of many factors
influencing the economic environment at the time, but its disruption to the international
market makes it a viable explanation for initiating the slowdown.
Destabilizing market conditions along with increased government involvement in
the economy shifted perceptions about the effectiveness and role of government in
economic affairs. The OPEC oil crisis, compounded with poor economic conditions in
the 1970s and 1980s, contributed to high unemployment and high inflation at the same
time the federal government increased social welfare spending. Increased spending on
social programs with lackluster results on poverty rates and economic stability caused
disillusionment about the effectiveness of antipoverty programs and the government’s

Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade, 77.
Danziger and Gottschalk, America Unequal, 4; Sar A. Levitan and Diane Werneke, Productivity:
Problems, Prospects, and Policies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 29.
10
11
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ability to control fluctuations in cyclical and structural unemployment. As a result,
pundits, policymakers, and the public developed a more pessimistic view, in which
government was the problem, and that “throwing money” at social programs failed to
solve the issues facing the nation’s poor. 12
Lagging productivity growth in the United States occurred simultaneously as
other nations like Japan experienced rates of productivity growth three times that of the
U.S. 13 The fall in U.S. productive competitiveness caused domestic capital investment – a
critical component for rising productivity growth – to fall substantially. Cheaper
manufacturing competition overseas motivated American corporations to divest from
their home operations and move capital abroad. From 1976-1980, American companies
and banks tripled their overseas investments. 14 The productivity decline quickly captured
the attention of labor economists, academics, and policymakers because of its perceived
threat to the U.S.’s long-term economic superiority. What about declines in productivity
growth worried economists and policymakers? Labor productivity still grew year to year
during the seventies, but it grew at slower rates. Why is productivity growth important,
and what does it mean for American workers and their compensation?
The economic transformations of the 1970s are of major significance to U.S. labor
history. The declines in productivity beginning in 1973 ended the proportional
relationship between productivity growth and wage growth in the American workforce.
During the Age of Compression, increases in productivity growth correlated to increases

Sar A. Levitan and Diane Werneke, Productivity: Problems, Prospects, and Policies, 22-23.
Harold Arnett and Neill Schmeichel, Increasing Productivity in the United States: A Political, Social,
and Economic Policy Approach (Montvale: National Association of Accountants, 1984), 11.
14
Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade, 206.
12
13
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in wage growth. The distribution of wealth was shared more equitably, where workers
producing more on average per year and were proportionally compensated for their
additional output per hour of work. But after consecutive years of declining productivity
growth starting in 1973, wage growth began to stagnate for low and middle-income
workers and has continued to do so for four decades.
Since 1973 in the United States, it is statistically accurate to state that the rich
have been getting richer while the poor have been getting poorer. Workers who entered
the labor market in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s did not inherit the same economic
security as their predecessors. Their jobs paid relatively lower wages, unionization rates
were half the rate they were in the 1950s, and fewer jobs offered the benefits associated
with the traditional middle-class lifestyle. Furthermore, when new “tides” of economic
growth came after 1973, they tended to only lift those at the top of the income
distribution while leaving low-income earners behind – furthering income inequality over
time. 15 Technological innovation, access to new markets, and improvements in capital
flows across countries increased international competition and forced American
corporations in the 1970s to rethink profit-maximizing decisions from a global labor
market perspective, which initiated a dramatic shift in the structure and makeup of the
American labor market.

Why Does Productivity Matter? Theories and Concepts
Labor productivity matters because it is used to measure a nation’s standard of
living, which incorporates the general level of wealth, goods, and necessities provided to
citizens of a given country. A comprehensive definition of labor productivity “measures
15

Danziger and Gottschalk, America Unequal, 2.
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the relationship between the quantity of goods and services produced during a period of
time and the input of labor, capital, and natural resources used in the production
process.” 16 One way to compose a nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the total
value of all final goods and services produced in a country within a given period – is by
multiplying labor productivity by the aggregate hours of labor to get total factor
production. Economists often calculate a nation’s standard of living by its Real GDP per
capita, or the average wealth generated per person in the country. Under this economic
understanding of national production, the more a nation produces the more income there
is to be shared among those participating in the economy.
Growth in labor productivity is the key to increasing the real purchasing power of
workers. By definition, growth occurs when output increases more than hours worked.
Fundamental labor economic theory claims a worker’s wage is equal to his or her
marginal productivity of labor, which is calculated by multiplying a worker’s marginal
productivity by the product’s price (MP * P = MPL = W). Under this theory, keeping all
things equal, increases in real output per worker should correlate with higher real wages.
Increased real incomes allow workers to consume a greater amount of goods for the same
level of work as before: “For workers to experience rising living standards over any
substantial period, labor productivity must also rise. That is, for a worker to be paid more
for an hour’s work, the value of that worker’s economic output must increase.” 17
Increasing productive efficiency is critical to creating rising real incomes for workers. It
is important to measure productivity growth because it is the economic factor that leads

Sar A. Levitan and Diane Werneke, Productivity: Problems, Prospects, and Policies, 5.
Jay Shambaugh, et al., “Thirteen Facts about Wage Growth,” Brookings Institution: The Hamilton
Project (September 2017), ii-iii.
16
17
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to more leisure time and higher incomes. In spurring productivity growth, the economy
can experience growth in labor income, profits to firms, and tax revenue to the public
sector to fund social programs and public works projects.
The foundations of contemporary productivity growth theory are the result of two
key twentieth century economists: Nicholas Kaldor and P.J. Verdoorn. Through their
research on taxation and growth in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, the European scholars
generated fundamental laws in economics regarding long-run productivity trends. The
Kaldor-Verdoorn Law, sometimes referred to as cumulative causation, claims that the
growth of a nation’s manufacturing sector was the key to spurring further economic
growth across industries of the economy. “Rapid growth of demand and output leads to
an increase in the growth of productivity due to increasing returns to scale, which
increases capital accumulation…this leads to competitive advantages, and consequently
to faster growth of exports, which in turn contributes to the growth of demand and to a
virtuous circle in process of cumulative causation.” 18 The theory claims that developed
nations with heavy manufacturing industries would “embark on a virtuous cycle of
productivity and income growth.” 19 The critical factor with cumulative causation theory
is its assumption of continuing increasing returns to the manufacturing sector and a focus
on research and development for technological change. This understanding of a “spillover
effect” from the manufacturing sector and increasing returns to scale laid the blueprint for
understanding productivity growth.

Ferdinando Targetti, “Nicholas Kaldor: Contributions to Development Economics,” Development and
Change 36, no. 6 (November 2005), 1191.
19
Steven Pressman and Richard Holt, “Nicholas Kaldor and Cumulative Causation: Public Policy
Implications,” Journal of Economic Issues 42, no. 2 (June 2008), 368.
18
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Many factors contribute to productivity growth. Technological advancements,
research and development, investment in human capital, and other improvements increase
output per hour of work. In terms of international trade, obtaining comparative
advantages in goods production increases a country’s total market share. If the nation is
able to maintain superiority in relative productivity growth, then it can also maintain its
market share and increase its standard of living as well as fund social programs to combat
poverty and inequality. If growth begins to lag behind other industrialized nations,
however, the laggard nation will have to compete by offering workers lower real wages
to offset the negative effects of lower productivity. 20 The latter case is the situation
American firms, workers, and policymakers confronted in the 1970s that upended the
traditional Keynesian economic paradigm.
The economic and political history of the 1970s illustrates the diffusion of the
post-war Keynesian paradigm in the United States. Under the Keynesian paradigm,
capital and labor prospered together during times of growth and proper government
intervention could stabilize the economy. 21 The combination of global forces and
legislative actions that took place in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the crises did not
solve the issue but, rather, depressed the long-term prosperity for the average American
worker. The economic relationship between growth in labor productivity and growth in
wages remains a controversial topic in academic circles as economists struggle to
pinpoint the factors associated with wage stagnation: “Wage stagnation has been a staple

Productivity Policy: Key to the Nation’s Economic Future, Committee for Economic Development (April
1983), 23-25.
21
Sarwat Jahan, et. al, “What is Keynesian Economics?” Journal of Finance and Development 51, no. 3
(September 2014); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade, xi.
20
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of economic analysis and commentary for a while now, though perhaps predictably
there’s little agreement about what’s driving it.” 22 What has mystified researchers is
accurately identifying the sources responsible for causing stagnant wage growth and a
widening earnings distribution between low-income workers and high-income workers.

A Guide for the Perplexed
The topic of income inequality has remained central to the American political
conscience since the late 1970s. The study of wage and income inequality highlights the
relative earnings gap between high-earners at the top of the income distribution and lowearners at the bottom income distribution in a given country. Despite extensive literature
on the subject, some fundamental questions remain. What factors contributed to the “Uturn” in productivity and wage earnings in the early 1970s? What contributed to the loss
of productive superiority and market leverage for the United States? What structural
changes led the Age of Compression – when wealth was shared more equitably – to
become an economic anomaly instead of the rule?
Numerous arguments have been offered by labor economists that attempt to
explain the expanding earnings gap. Explanations range from international competition,
the influx of baby-boomers and women into the labor force, less demand for low-skilled
workers, an increasing college wage premium, and changes in corporate management
culture. Researchers continue to disagree over which factors are most responsible for the
1970s productivity woes and its corollary relationship in expanding the earnings gap
between low-earners and high-earners in the United States. “Although shifts in relative

Drew DeSilver, “For most workers, real wages have barely budged for decades,” Pew Research Center,
October 9, 2014.
22
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labor demand against less-educated and ‘less-skilled’ workers undoubtedly are a major
reason for these shifts in the labor-market outcomes, research on the underlying reasons
for these demand shifts (e.g., technological change, increased international competition,
etc.) is still incomplete." 23 Despite methodological disputes, labor economists are in
agreement that today’s working individuals face a radically different labor market than
previous generations.
A gap exists in the literature about the failure of the marginal productivity theory
and its relationship to wage determination. Since 1973, labor productivity has continued
to increase steadily – albeit not as high of a rate as during the Age of Compression. The
stark difference post-1973, however, is productivity gains have not transferred into higher
earnings for workers like they did from 1947 to 1973. Alongside economics, the cultural
transformation caused by the growth and prosperity experienced in three decades after the
war further engrained the belief in American meritocracy: the belief that workers could
advance up the economic ladder no matter their standing by working hard and playing by
the rules. The legitimacy of this notion, which has evolved to be a core principle of the
American identity, has now become a statistical falsehood. In this context, what are we to
make of statistics about income disparity, wage stagnation, and lackluster growth in the
average standard of living for working Americans? Does it matter that there is more
income inequality, lack of upper mobility, and less opportunity for personal growth in the
United States? If so, what (if anything) should be done to address it?

David Cutler and Lawrence Katz, “Rising Inequality? Changes in the Distribution of Income and
Consumption in the 1980’s,” AEA Papers and Proceedings 82, no. 2 (May 1992), 550.
23
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The history of the American wage structure since 1973 raises the question of
whether morality can be included in the construction of economic theory and policy. Data
and studies consistently disprove foundational economic principles regarding wage
determination, yet the facts have failed to significantly overturn traditional dogma
surrounding labor productivity and compensation. Economists declare the existence of
inequalities are simply the result of “free market forces,” merely a byproduct of the
capitalist system at work. 24 Is morality mutually exclusive from economics? Popular
opinion towards economics and social welfare policy has shifted since the late 1970s
away from notions of the common good to amoral absolutism of the invisible hand of the
market. Furthermore, economic theories are often laden with biased assumptions.
Economic models are merely simplifications of reality based upon simplifying
assumptions and are many times disproven by real data, yet the field adheres to them as
sacrosanct. As time has progressed, certain simplifying assumptions within labor
economic theory no longer apply to the statistical evidence, particularly with wage
determination and income distribution.
The purpose of this work is to historiographically organize the numerous
explanations put forth by labor economists and historians to explain the sharp decline in
productivity growth that occurred in the early 1970s and its relation to subsequent
decades of wage stagnation and rising income inequality. The project will assess the key
variables influencing the decline in U.S. productivity growth in the 1970s and
contextualize its long-term effect on the U.S. labor market and income inequality. Part I
provides an abstract of income inequality statistics and examines the variables

24

John Cassidy, “The Great Productivity Puzzle,” The New Yorker, August 10, 2016.
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economists use to measure and graphically depict inequality among individuals and
families. Part II examines the historiography of the explanations from notable scholars in
the field. The conclusion offers an assessment of the proceeding explanations and argues
the existence of a new developing economic paradigm.
There is no simple explanation for why wages have stagnated over the past halfcentury in the United States. Presenting the historiography of economic research on the
topic, this paper attempts to create a concise overview of wage and income inequality in
the United States. Properly identifying the sources of slower growth and rising inequality
can help labor economists predict future trends. A greater understanding of the variables
contributing to increasing income inequality can better inform public policy decisions,
which can enable governments and businesses to partner to help firms and workers adjust
to an evolving labor market. Put best by labor economist Alan Blinder in 1982:
“What this country needs now in the realm of income distribution policy is exactly
what it needs, and has often been unable to get, in so many other problem areas:
An economic policy with a hard head and a soft heart. A hard head to remind us
of the wondrous efficiency of the marketplace, and how foolish it is to squander
this efficiency without good reason. And a soft heart to remind us that
championing the cause of the society’s underdog has long been, and remains, one
of the noblest functions of government.” 25
The purpose of this work is to provide a digestible abstract of the origins of wage and
income inequality in the United States that best fits the data and evidence available. By

Alan Blinder, The Truce in the War on Poverty: Where Do We Go From Here? (Washington, D.C.:
National Policy Exchange, 1982), 30.
25
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placing the experts in conversation with one another, this work presents a concise
historiography of a critical economic phenomenon that still lacks consensus in the field of
economics.

Part I: Divergence
The Productivity Puzzle
Figure 1. Change in Productivity and Hourly Compensation, 1948-2015

(Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Economic Policy Institute, 2017)
Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown in the proportional relationship between
productivity growth and wage growth in the U.S. labor market. From 1947 to 1973,
productivity and wages grew in tandem by 2 to 3% per year. Annual growth in labor
productivity averaged 3.3% per year from 1947-1966 and 2.2% from 1966-1973. The
high and consistent rate of growth over these years led to the doubling of both labor
productivity and labor income. The U.S. economy encountered economic troubles when
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productivity dropped sharply to an average of 1.2% from 1973-1977 and eventually
reached a negative growth rate of -0.4% by the end of 1980. 26
It is clear from Figure 1 that gains in productivity since 1973 have not gone to
workers in the form of higher compensation. Thomas Kochan, Co-Director for the
Institute for Work and Employment Research, argues the disconnect between
productivity growth and wage growth reflects a breakdown in the modern American
social contract, where he defines social contract as “the expectation that wages for
average workers will grow in rough tandem with aggregate productivity growth in the
U.S. economy.” 27 Since 1945, the U.S economy has experienced two diametrically
opposing economic eras. In the first, the early post-war era was an economy where
growth was shared more equitably, productivity gains translated into greater real incomes
for working Americans, and the phrase “a rising tide lifts all boats” held true. In the
second, the post-1973 economy restructured itself towards industries that offered lower
wages, less benefits, and less job security to the American workforce. And when
economic growth occurred, the benefits disproportionately accrued to those at the top of
the income distribution.
Figure 1 represents the foundation of this thesis: revisiting the legitimacy of
classical labor economic theory regarding wage determination. Thomas Picketty, a
contemporary researcher on the topic, critiques classical labor economic theory: “The
most striking failure of the theory of marginal productivity and the race between

Harold Arnett and Neill Schmeichel, Increasing Productivity in the United States: A Political, Social,
and Economic Policy Approach (Montvale: National Association of Accountants, 1984), 11.
27
Thomas Kochan, “The American Jobs Crisis and its Implication for the Future of Employment Policy: A
Call for a New Jobs Compact,” Industrial Relations and Labor Review 66, no. 2 (April 2013): 293-94.
26
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education and technology is no doubt its inability to adequately explain the explosion of
very high incomes from labor observed in the United States since 1980.” 28 Why are
workers not being equitably compensated for the productivity of their labor? Why did
economic theory regarding a worker’s productivity and compensation hold true during
the Age of Compression but suddenly break down after 1973?

The “Golden Age” of Capitalism
Figure 2. Median and Mean family income, 1947-1991

(Source: Danzinger and Gottschalk, 41)
In terms of family income, the “good old days” fall within the years of the Age of
Compression (1947-1973). There are two main variables often used to assess family
incomes that provide context for the nation’s standard of living: median and mean
income. Median income shows how the average or “typical” American family is doing in
the economy, where half of Americans are faring worse and the other half are faring
better. Mean income, on the other hand, is relatively more affected by changes in the

28

Thomas Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 314.
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levels of income at the upper and lower ends of the income distribution. Figure 2 tracks
both variables using 1947 indexed at 1.0. Both median and mean family income grew in
tandem from 1947 to 1973 similar to productivity and wages. Parallel growth reveals
income growth was relatively constant across income levels. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, however, the mean grew faster than the median, which indicated that inequality
started to rise. 29 Figure 2 visually captures the shift towards inequality in the 1980s when
growth in mean income outpaced growth in median income.

Figure 3. ACC production, capital stock, productivity, & employment, 1955-1980

(Source: Glyn, et. al., 49)
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The first six years after the Second World War, defined as the “reconstruction
period” from 1945 to 1951, are considered by scholars to be the critical years when
institutional shifts created long-term implications for the international economy. This is
due partially to the rise of new international situations such as the Cold War and a
movement towards internationalism in Europe. The political and economic effects of the
Marshall Plan and the collective effort to rebuild the European economy laid critical
foundations for trade relationships. For example, the turnaround in economic productivity
for Western European countries was so fast that France, Italy, Germany, and the
Netherlands “caught up with their own highest prewar level of production in an
impressively short span of time, reaching it between 1947 and 1951.” 30 There were fears
the end of the war would initiate another elongated depression around the globe. Instead,
the conclusion of the war unleashed the most unprecedented worldwide growth in
history. Armstrong, Glyn, and Harrison (1984) in Capitalism since 1945 attribute the
exponential growth to newly forged international relationships: “Reconstruction involved
the formation of the basic relationships between labour and capital within each country
and of the relations between the various countries, which were to underpin the subsequent
boom.” 31 The movement toward internationalism instead of isolationism allowed for new
forms of capital, information, and people to connect that laid the groundwork for what
would become “globalization,” as it is defined today.
The quarter-century after the reconstruction period created unprecedented
prosperity for the world economy. Specifically, the rates of growth were “historically
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unprecedented” for advanced capitalist countries (ACCs), where GDP and GDP per
capita from 1950 to 1973 grew twice as fast as any period since 1820. Additionally, the
golden age experienced historical rates of productivity growth and capital accumulation
(Figure 3). Between the early 1950s and 1970s, total world output in manufacturing more
than quadrupled and the amount of world trade increased eightfold. Research on the early
post-war economy by Andrew Glyn, Alan Hughes, Alain Litpietz, and Ajut Singh (1990)
defines the golden age by two key characteristics: “The central features of the
macroeconomic pattern during the golden age were: (i) rapid and parallel growth of
productivity and capital stock per worker; and (ii) parallel growth of real wages and
productivity.” 32 According to scholars, the two factors permitted sustained economic
growth during the period defined as the Golden Age of Capitalism.
Economists agree that the economic environment during the early post-war period
was the result of multiple short-run stimuli for the demand for labor and “of institutional
changes brought about by the war and the command economy that accompanied it.” 33
Evidence of problems became apparent when the U.S. labor market began to experience a
full-employment profit squeeze in the late 1960s, where wage acceleration started to
outpace productivity growth resulting in smaller profit shares to firms. Profits strongly
influence investment, and decreased investment often correlates to decreases in
productivity growth. The late 1960s profit squeeze was a key precursor to productivity
declines. As the authors point out, the slowdown in productivity growth “was not a
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phenomenon associated with business ‘cycles,’ …but the result of a long period of
sustained growth, rising wages, high employment, and increasing economic security for
working people.” 34 Cross-country data supports the argument that the slow decline in
profit shares in the late 1960s correlated to firms decreasing their levels of investment,
further contributing to the slowdown process. Then 1973 hit.
Figure 4. Output per Hour in Nonfarm Business Sector, Actual and Predicted, 1967-1979

(Source: Gordon, 459)
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The U-Turn and “Quiet Depression”
For economists, the 1970s were bewildering: “Several important studies have
documented a slowdown in the secular growth rate of productivity that has taken
place…and most studies appear to leave the causes of a large portion of the deceleration
as an unresolved puzzle.” 35 Labor productivity took a sharp decline from its steady
growth during the 1950s and 1960s. Labor productivity in the private business sector
from 1973 to 1978 grew at only one-third the rate of growth from 1948 to 1965. Figure 4
tracks non-farm business sector productivity from 1967 to 1979, which depicts three
noticeable slowdowns after peaks in 1969, 1973, and 1979. 36 The distinct slowdown from
1973 to 1975 represents the turning point regarding the long-term nature of productivity
growth and wage growth.
Some of the earliest research on the productivity slowdown concerned short-run
variables. Economist Robert J. Gordon (1979) discussed “End of Expansion” effects
during the 1970s reflecting fluctuations in the business cycle. Viewing the issue with
short-run implications, Gordon’s analysis suggested economic trends such as lags in the
hiring process and high turnover rates were the main factors responsible for the abrupt
productivity slowdown that occurred both in 1973 and again in 1979. 37 Other researchers
like J.R. Norsworthy, Micheal Harper, and Kent Kunze (1979) attributed the productivity
slowdown from 1973 to 1978 to a decrease in capital formation: “In the second period
[1973-78], capital effects contribute nearly 80 percent of the observed slowdown in labor
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productivity.” 38 The authors agree with the general consensus that the rise in energy
prices starting in 1973 is a potential catalyst for causing the slowdown: “If capital and
energy are compliments, the rise in energy prices would have retarded capital
formation.” 39 These explanations, among others, will be discussed further in Part II but
are mentioned here as some of the earliest reactors to the phenomenon. Later scholars,
with the help of hindsight, view the 1973 shock as the pivotal shift between two
economic eras rather than short-run behaviors: “It is clear in retrospect that 1973 marked
the watershed between the golden age years of rapid growth and the stagnation which
followed.” 40
Figure 5. Wage Inequality Accounting for Business Cycle,
Baby Boom, and Strong Dollar, 1969-1983

(Source: Harrison, et. al, “Wage Inequality Takes a Great U-Turn,” 31)
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The distribution of wages and salaries took a distinctive U-turn between 1975 and
1978 (Figure 6), which established a trend of inequality that has persisted to this day for
low-wage workers. The recession of 1973 was the longest economic downturn since the
1930s, lasting sixteen months. Figure 4 created by labor economists Harrison Bennett,
Chris Tilly, and Barry Bluestone (1986) reveals how income inequality became a lagging
indicator from the recession after accounting for business cycles, the entrance of baby
boomers into the labor force, and a strong dollar. The authors point out, “This was before
the election of Ronald Reagan, before the passage of the sharply regressive tax act of
1981, and even before the official commencement of the monetarist experiment in
1979.” 41 For reasons economists and historians still debate, there was a fundamental shift
in the distribution of earnings in the 1970s towards greater inequality. The
transformation, however, was subtle. Economist Frank Levy in Dollars and Dreams
(1987) labeled the decade from 1973 to 1982 as the “quiet depression” in which median
income fell while the poverty rate increased. 42
Table 1 shows the trend in median income from 1949 to 1991 and its relation to
the poverty line. There are two key takeaways. The first column shows the doubling of
median real income from 1949 to 1969 (99.3%) but a complete stagnation in median
family income growth from 1973 to 1991 (3.4%). Second, the average American’s
standard of living peaked in 1989 – much after the 1973 woes began. This does not mean,
however, that all Americans were better off in 1989, only that there was a larger
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aggregate amount of income at the end of the decade than at the beginning. 43 Steady
economic growth occurred in the late 1980s, but it was not shared evenly: “Although the
economic recovery of the 1980s lasted longer than most recoveries, its effects on living
standards were modest.” 44 The 1970s and 1980s produced negligible improvement in
median standard of living in the United States.

Table 1. Trends in median family income and median adjusted income
divided by the poverty line, 1949-1991

(Source: Danziger and Gottschalk, 46)
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Inequality on the loose
Figure 6. U.S. Gini Coefficient, 1947-2015 (with projection to 2020)

(Source: Kollmeyer, 2)
One of the most often used statistics to assess inequality is the Gini Coefficient,
which is a ratio ranging from zero (complete equality) to one (complete inequality)
representing the wealth distribution of a nation’s citizens. It is derived from the Lorenz
Curve, which tracks the percentage of aggregate income earned by each percentile of the
population. The Gini Coefficient reached its minimum level in 1967 and 1968 of around
0.35 then drastically peaked in 1989 at roughly .40, revealing the stark U-turn in the
income distribution in the 1970s. The measurement flaw with the Gini coefficient is that
is does not reveal where in the income distribution the inequality is occurring. It does not
tell the whole story about inequality, but the ratio does provide significant context for
assessing the magnitude of inequality taking place in a given country. 45
Christopher Kollmeyer, “Trade union decline, deindustrialization, and rising income inequality in the
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Figure 7. Inequality among Families: Percentiles Relative to Median Income, 1963-1989

(Source: Karoly, 17)
Economist Lynn Karoly’s study of income inequality among families, workers,
and individuals in 1992 provides ample evidence of increasing income inequality. Figure
7 shows the changing shape of the income distribution, where incomes at the top of the
income distribution grew faster than the median and incomes at the bottom of the
distribution have declined relative to the median. “Regardless of the unit of analysis or
the income measure, families and individuals at the bottom of the distribution lost ground
in real terms, while the ground gained by those above the median was greater the higher
their level of income.” 46 The increase in the relative earnings gap along with evidence of
increases in the number of citizens in the lower and upper classes have supported the
notion of a shrinking middle class.
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Figure 8. Income share of top decile (10%) in the United States, 1910-2010

(Source: Thomas Picketty, 291)
Analysis by French economist Thomas Picketty in Capital in the Twenty-First
Century (2014) shows the top decile’s share of income remained steady from 1940 to
1980 but rose exponentially thereafter. The upper decile’s share of income increased
from around 35% in the 1970s to nearly 50% by 2000 – similar levels on the eve of the
1929 crash. “The shape of the curve is rather impressively steep, and it is natural to
wonder how long such a rapid increase can continue: if change continues at the same
pace, for example, the upper decile will be raking in 60 percent of national income by
2030.” 47 Scholars like Picketty attribute the rise in income inequality to the dramatic
increase in very high incomes to supermanagers: “The increase was largely the result of
an unprecedented increase in wage inequality and in particular the emergence of
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extremely high remunerations at the summit of the wage hierarchy, particularly among
top managers of large firms.” 48 His argument will be discussed at greater length in Part
II, but it is important to note the statistical phenomenon revealing growing inequality
through rapidly increasing earnings at the top of the income distribution.
Figure 9. Share of aggregate income received
by bottom 40 percent of families, 1947-1991

(Source: Danzinger and Gottschalk, America Unequal, 50)
Figure 9 charts the aggregate income earned by bottom forty percent of families
from 1947 to 1991. From 1947 to 1969, the income shares of the bottom forty percent of
earners grew while the share of the top quintile declined. Between 1969 and 1989,
however, the bottom forty percent of earners saw their income share fall from 18 percent
to 15.2 percent between 1969 and 1989, an 18% decline of their income share. 49 Decline
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in real incomes at the bottom of the distribution occurred simultaneously as the share of
incomes rose for those at the top of the income distribution in the 1970s and 1980s.
Figure 10. 80/20 Ratio: income of family at 80th percentile
to that of a family at 20th percentile, 1947-1991

(Source: Danzinger and Gottschalk, America Unequal, 48)
The same scenario is evident in Figure 10, which charts the ratio of real income of
families at the 80th percentile to that of families at the 20th percentile. For example, using
data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the ratio value of 3.71 in 1991 “indicates that
the family at the 80th percentile received an income ($62,991) almost four times as large
as that of the family at the 20th percentile ($17,000).” 50 The number of graphs measuring
inequality are vast, and what is clear is that income inequality has increased dramatically
in the United States since 1973.
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Was the Age of Compression an economic anomaly? Economists Sheldon
Danzinger and Peter Gottschalk believe it was an anomaly. The scholars claim the
breadth of theoretical and historical evidence supports the notion that inequality is the
norm: “There is nothing about a market economy that ensures that a rising standard of
living will be accompanied by reduced inequality.” 51 Offering general labor economic
theory regarding the supply and demand of labor and wage determination, they conclude
“economic theory predicts neither that a market economy will yield an equitable
distribution of earnings nor that the distribution will be stable over time.” 52 Prices adjust
to clear the market with supply and demand, and when demand for skilled labor exceeds
the supply, the wages of skilled workers increases while the wages of lower-skilled
workers remain stagnant. The long-run historical record supports the claim that changes
in inequality are the rule and not the exception. Jeffrey Williamson and Peter Lindert
(1980) analyzed inequality beginning in the nineteenth century, documenting numerous
cases of severe fluctuations in the distribution of income with “antebellum surges” during
war times during the nation’s lifetime. 53 In this context, what are we to make of the postWorld War II economic surge that moved the economy towards greater equality?
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Part II: Historiography
The “Catch-Up” Hypothesis: Productivity Convergence
The first explanation is the “Catch-Up” hypothesis. The historiography begins
with this explanation for two reasons. First, it presents the longest data trend ranging
from 1870 to 1979 from research conducted by Angus Maddison in tracking long-run
economic development. 54 Secondly, its premise will connect to nearly all other
explanations in this work. The hypothesis claims that being “backward” in labor
productivity at the end of the 19th century presented nations with the potential for rapid
technological advance in the future. By backwards, it is meant to define the relative gap it
levels of technology between underdeveloped and advanced nations. Statistically, there is
a strong inverse correlation between a country’s productivity standing in 1870 and its
average rate of productivity growth since then. Data shows nations with the lowest GDP
per work hour in 1870 ended up having the highest average rate of productivity growth
overall in the century that followed: “the proposition is that in comparisons across
countries the growth rates of productivity in any long period trend to be inversely related
to the initial level of productivity.” 55 Nations behind in obtaining the best technology
have the opportunity to “catch-up” to the industrial leader.
The logic is based on the technological capabilities of a country’s capital stock,
whether the country is “technologically backwards” in relation to its counterparts, and its
social structure. Determining a nation’s potential for advancement takes into
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consideration the level of a country’s social capabilities such as education, business
environment, and government institutions. The diffusion of knowledge and technology is
also a critical factor for initiating the catch-up process: “The flow of knowledge from
leader to followers is, of course, the very essence of the catch-up hypothesis.” 56 In this
context, countries behind in technology have the potential for rapid economic growth,
provided that they are socially capable of exploiting the new technology transferred from
the productivity leader to followers.
The main drawback of the catch-up process, however, is to be found in a
fundamental law of economics: decreasing marginal returns. Data reveal productivity
levels eventually plateau among countries over time, and that a follower’s ability for
further growth diminishes the more the technological gap closes with the leader: “The
catch-up process is self-limiting because as a follower catches up, the possibility of
making large leaps by replacing superannuated with best-practice technology becomes
smaller and smaller.” 57 Followers capitalize on contemporary technologies from the
industrial leaders, but as time progresses they become nearly identical in productive
capability. Economic problems arise when relative productivities converge and the
industrial leader switches positions and becomes a laggard. If the follower can exploit the
new technology and exhibits the proper social capabilities for product maximization, then
competition begins. Comparative advantages determine trade, which can retard the
growth of the industrial leader if they fall behind in productivity growth. 58 The economic
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burdens associated with convergence, therefore, become shared mainly by the industrial
leader. The practical application of this hypothesis, as one may infer, is the United States.
One of the first economists to present a theory resembling convergence was
American economist Thorstein Veblen in 1915 with his study of Germany’s
industrialization prior to World War I. Veblen argued the existence of long-term
drawbacks for being an industrial leader. In his assessment of the production capacity of
Imperial Germany as an industrial leader in Europe, he states, “In many accounts current
of German economic achievement during the Imperial era much is made of the handicap
under which the German people came into the concern of industrial communities in the
nineteenth century…This handicap is made up of the several difficulties that beset the
newcomer who goes to work with scant means and slight experience.” 59 Veblen realized
from Germany’s industrialization the flaw with being the industrial leader: there is less
ability to free-ride. The labor productivity of followers increases and converges with the
industrial leader because, with the adequate capital and social capability, followers
exploit best-practice technologies that result in greater total output. Information sharing
and capital transfers close the technological gap between the leader and follower,
eventually reaching a peak (i.e. convergence) because of diminishing marginal returns.
Veblen’s notion of convergence reentered economic discussions in the 1950s by
economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron, in a series of essays that led to his 1962
book, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. The former head of the
Institute of Economic History at Harvard University, Gerschenkron criticized “the grand
Marxian generalization” that industrialization occurred in a uniform process with
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universal characteristics. He refuted Marx, arguing “every historical event that takes
places changes the course of all subsequent events…the Industrial Revolution in England,
and for that matter in other countries, affected the course of all subsequent
industrializations.”60 Under this interpretation, Gerschenkron claimed underdeveloped
nations can capitalize on new forms of technology used by advanced nations. Provided
the opportunity, underdeveloped nations borrowing the latest forms of technology are
more apt to succeed in industrialization. Even further, they can industrialize more
efficiently. This brings greater legitimacy to the inverse correlation between
“backwardness” in relative levels of technology and the potential for future higher rates
of growth. Gerschenkron stressed the importance of the interactions between advanced
and underdeveloped nations, claiming a symbiotic relationship exists where further
industrialization of advanced nations changes depending on the relative backwardness of
underdeveloped followers. 61 Through his critique of classical Marxist economic theory,
Gerschenkron’s theories about relative standing in terms of technological capability
added critical pillars to the catch-up hypothesis.
Edward Ames and Nathaniel Rosenberg (1963) provided significant support for
the hypothesis they define as the “penalty for taking the lead” or “theory of the late
starter.” The authors claimed the problem surrounding productivity and the legitimacy of
the convergence thesis comes down to three critical variables: a nation’s technology, its
output, and transition costs. In keeping with authors like Gerschenkron, Ames and
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Rosenberg agreed the relative timing of industrialization matters: “It is certainly a fact
that the countries whose industries have grown fastest in the past one hundred years are
not those which grew most rapidly in the preceding century.” 62 After going through
hypothetical situations of technological transfers, access to banking, and state
intervention, the authors put forth a thesis concluding “that late comers will surpass early
starters, partly because the latter will cease to develop.” 63 Their research added greater
emphasis to the effects of decreasing marginal returns. Additionally, they make clear that
late-comers have certain advantages over the leader, but the advantages they obtain as
laggards does not outweigh the net benefits of being the leader.
Figure 11. Gross Domestic Product per Work-Hour, 1870-1986

(Source: Maddison, 212; Nelson and Wright, 1932)
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Publications in the mid-1980s added significant support for the hypothesis with
quantitative macroeconomic history and graphical analysis. The economic historian
accredited with amassing the productivity data from 1870 to 1979 was British economic
historian Angus Maddison. In his 1982 work, Phases of Capitalist Development,
Maddison gathered productivity data from sixteen industrialized countries that led to the
creation of critical figures and tables visually depicting the process of convergence. His
data analysis from 1982 is supported with additional research in 1986 by two other
notable economists, William Baumol and Moses Abramovitz.
Table 2. Total Growth from 1870 to 1979
Productivity, GDP Per Capita, and Exports (%Δ)
Sixteen Industrialized Countries

(Source: Maddison, 8, 212, 248-53; Baumol, 1074)
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William Baumol’s 1986 article “Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare”
deconstructs the economic phenomenon associated with Maddison’s data research. Table
2 reveals a noticeable contrast in development between the sixteen nations. In the first
column, growth in GDP per work-hour ranged from approximately 400 percent in
Australia all the way up to nearly 2,500 percent in Japan. The performance of the United
States ranks in the middle of the group at around 1100 percent, where the median
increase in productivity among the 16 countries was 1150 percent. The impact of these
levels of productivity growth resulted in dramatic increases in output per capita: “The rise
in productivity was sufficient to permit output per capita [column 2] to increase more
than 300 percent in the United Kingdom, 800 percent in West Germany, 1700 percent in
Japan and nearly 700 percent in France and the United States.” 64 The rankings in rates of
growth represented in the first column of Table 2, with Australia being last and Japan
being first in overall average growth since 1870, offers significant insight into which
nations began as “backwards” in 1870 and by what degree.
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Figure 12. Average Productivity Growth Rate, 1870-1979 vs. 1870 Base Level

(Source: Maddison, 212; Baumol, 1076)
Baumol quantified the inverse correlation between a nation’s productivity level in
1870 and its average rate of growth until 1979. The convergence phenomenon, Baumol
argues, is confirmed by Figure 12. The horizontal axis represents Maddison’s
calculations for each country’s absolute level of GDP per work-hour in 1870. On the
vertical axis is the average growth rate of GDP per work-hour since 1870. A visible
correlation is evident from the figure, and Baumol calculated the correlation coefficient
of the equation to have R2 equal 0.88. 65 Supporting Ames and Rosenberg, Baumol argues
the strong correlation exists because improvements in technology transfers allowed for
the benefits of technological advancement to be contagious: “one country’s successful
investment policy will also raise productivity and living standards in other industrialized
countries.” 66 Specifically after World War II, the rise in information sharing and
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increases in employment in “information activities” through U.S. manufacturing
investment in Europe, along with technology transfers from multinational corporations,
exacerbated the forces of convergence. “This encourages reinterpretation of the postwar
growth period as one of temporary catch-up, merely making up for opportunities
previously forgone.” 67 He also notes, however, that high rates of growth contributed by
the catch-up process will fade and competition will rise based on relative productivity
growth rates, which, as stated earlier, can result in economic downturns for the industrial
leader.
Moses Abramovitz (1986) deconstructed the characteristics that define a nation’s
social capability and its ability to advance technologically. Abramovitz affirmed
differences among countries in productivity levels creates a strong potential for
subsequent convergence of levels, provided that said countries have a social capability to
absorb new technologies from abroad: “The trouble with absorbing social capability into
the catchup hypothesis is that no one knows just what it means or how to measure it.” 68
Filling this void, he claimed social capability depended on “education and the
organization of firms…their openness to competition, to the establishment of new firms,
and to the sale and purchase of new goods and services.” 69 Additionally, institutional and
human capital components develop slowly as education and technology adapt to
innovation. The potential for catch-up also depends on additional variables such freedom
of information and knowledge, logistics, and rates of investment. Abramovitz’s
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sociological examination raises the consideration that a nation’s unique social capability
can influence its technological growth: “In the one case, the evolution of social capability
connected with catching up itself raises the possibility that followers may forge ahead of
even progressive leaders. In the other, a leader may fall back…” 70 Here, the hypothesis
directly connects to the case of lagging productivity growth in United States in the 1970s
and its loss in being the industrial leader internationally.
Richard Nelson and Gavin Wright (1992) support Abramovitz and reflected on
the rise and fall of America’s technological leadership in the late 1970s. “Over the postWorld War II era, commodity and resource trade, business and finance, and technological
communities, have all become increasingly transnational rather than national.” 71 The
scholars agreed with the general consensus of prior research stating that the unique postwar economic environment aided in the supremacy of U.S. technological leadership and
growth, but the post-war increase in technological transfers allowed other industrializing
nations to join the “convergence club” and compete with the United States for the first
time. 72
The premise of the catch-up hypothesis is bold. It implies only one variable, GDP
per work-hour in 1870, determined a nation’s projected growth rate for the next 110 years
as if no other variables mattered. Not geographical location, access to markets, culture, or
government structure. “What is striking is the apparent implication that only one variable,
a country’s 1870 GDP per work-hour…matters to any substantial degree, and that other
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variables have only a peripheral influence.” 73 Was it merely fate? As proper historians
and economists, the authors reject the idea of fate. Instead, they point to a more rational
interpretation: technology acts like a public good. The improvement of technology
transfers in the second half of the twentieth century made for the newest forms of capital
to be available and nonexcludable to nearly all industrialized countries, strengthening the
powers of convergence and further decreasing the productivity differential between
laggards and the leader.
There are economic downsides to lagging productivity growth, and the burden
lands upon the workers of the country through decreased real wages. According to the
experts, the economic impact of lagging productivity will not diminish trade significantly
but rather decay the nation’s standard of living: “The exchange rate and standard of
living of the country with lagging productivity will bear the brunt of the burden as it is
forced, increasingly, to compete by means of relatively low wages.” 74 The catch-up
hypothesis directly connects to the stagnation of American wages beginning in the 1970s
when US economic hegemony frayed. Whether the catch-up process is the only culprit
for initiating U.S. productivity slowdown remains unclear, but the historical evidence
offers significant context for why the 1970s proved to be the pivotal decade in altering
the economic affairs of the United States.

In the Short-Run
Transitioning from century-long data, there are four general opinions about the
decline in productivity growth in 1973 that entail short-run factors: rises in energy prices,
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declines in research and development expenditures, decreases in capital formation, and
monetary policy to control inflation. Some scholars attribute the 1973-74 decline in
productivity growth to be caused by the significant rise in OPEC oil prices. Harold Arnett
and Neill Schmeichel (1984) claim “some feel the continuing high prices and changeable
patterns of scarcity through 1981 (depending on the production schedules of OPEC
countries) had a negative impact on productivity.” 75 Energy prices effect productivity as
firms are forced to siphon funds away from capital investment and research and
development in order to compensate for higher costs of production, which diverts funding
away from the factors necessary for sustained productivity growth.
Research proves increases in energy prices beginning in 1973 contributed to
inflation and a reduction in U.S. total output. According to the Committee for Economic
Development in 1983, the rise in energy prices hurt the economy but contributed little to
overall productivity declines: “Most statistical studies have shown that although the
energy problem influenced productivity slowdown, its direct contribution was probably
small. This is because the share of energy as an input is small compared with those of
other inputs for U.S. industry as a whole.” 76 The Committee does claim, however, that
the energy crisis had a significant indirect effect on the productivity slowdown through
discouragement of investing in new capital.
Tracing the rise of the OPEC organization in the 1960s, historian Judith Stein
(2010) highlighted how the demand and supply of the U.S. oil market was headed toward
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conflict in the 1970s when domestic oil production maxed its capacity: “Beneath the
radar, American demand was rising while domestic supply fell. Once, excess capacity in
Texas protected the West from supply disruptions. No more.” 77 OPEC’s economic
influence became so powerful that Saudi oil chief Sheik Yamani bragged the oil coalition
could single-handedly “dictate the flow of oil and the price of oil.” 78 No longer could oil
producing nations increase production when oil prices fell to maintain revenue streams.
OPEC would instead use its market power to receive similar revenue levels by raising oil
prices, not production. The sudden rise in energy prices caused Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to experience rates of
inflation greater than ten percent, and it switched the United States’ trade surplus into a
trade deficit for the first time in over a century: “The oil bill of consuming countries rose
from $50 billion in 1973 to over $130 billion in 1974. This arithmetic changed a trade
surplus [for the U.S.] of $15 billion into a deficit of $60 billion.” 79 Sar Levitan and Diane
Werneke (1984) claimed higher energy prices led to demand-side policy responses
resulting in high inflation, high unemployment, and a poor investment environment.
Additionally, higher energy prices created a substitution effect for less-productive
alternatives to energy. “The United States, which had the lowest-priced oil among the
major industrial countries and the most energy-intensive economy, was forced to make
abrupt adjustments.” 80 The oil crisis represented a key fissure in the economic hegemony
of the United States in the twentieth century.
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The second popular opinion is firms significantly reduced investments in research
and development (R&D). Expenditures in R&D are expected to increase productivity
through the development of best-practice technologies and equipment to improve the
efficiency of the production process. Data analysis from economists John Kendrick and
Elliot Grossman (1980) affirmed declines in R&D was the variable with the strongest
correlation with productivity trends: “Of the six variables, only research and development
(R&D) spending had a significant and stable relationship with productivity over the two
periods [1948-66, 1967-76].” 81 During the Age of Compression, small businesses were
the main source of new innovations. According to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in 1980, small businesses accounted for over nearly half of the nation’s
innovations from 1953 and 1973. The agency also noted, however, private R&D
expenditures dropped 13 percent between 1968 and 1978. Some scholars argue that
additional government regulations created a hostile environment toward innovation in
terms of cost, time, and discouraging risk. 82
Most scholars do not consider the reduction in R&D expenditures to be the main
source of the productivity slowdown in the 1970s. Levitan and Werneke dismiss the
impact of declining R&D investments: “Because of the relatively long time lag between
investments in basic research, patenting, and commercialization of new products or
processes…it is unlikely that the slowdown in R&D expenditures has played a major role
in domestic productivity performance.” 83 Even though total expenditures declined,
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research and development funding by private industry accounted for roughly one percent
of Gross National Product (GNP) during the 1960s and 1970s and continued to increase
to an estimated 1.4 percent of GNP by the 1980s. According to economists Nadiri,
Kendrick, Griliches, and Denison (1983), the slowdown in R&D expenditures only
contributed to an average of 16 percent to the overall productivity slowdown. 84
Economist Edwin Mansfield in his 1982 work Technology Transfer, Productivity, and
Economic Policy viewed the R&D situation through a lens of international competition.
After World War II, nations feared becoming technologically dependent on the United
States. For example, nations like Japan did not like the creation of R&D sites of
American multinational firms within the country because there was a subtle belief that
the sites were designed to cause a “brain drain” of the host country’s top scientists and
researchers. 85 Fears dissipated in the 1970s and 1980s as non-U.S. multinational firms
became more prevalent in world markets. Mansfield concluded there was generally a
negligible impact to a firm’s sales and its level of R&D spending. Firms investing in
research and development is a critical component to innovation and the development of
new best-practice technologies and machinery. Although important, the decline in
research and development expenditures in the 1970s had a minimal impact on overall
labor productivity slowdown.
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Table 3. Capital and Labor Effects on Growth of Labor Productivity,
Private Nonfarm Nonmanufacturing Sector, 1949-78

(Source: Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze, 418)
Decreases in capital formation is the third popular short-run explanation. Three
scholars from the Bureau of Labor Statistics – Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze – claim
there were two distinct phases in the slowdown of American labor productivity: 1967-73
and 1973-78. The slowdown in the first period was caused by unexplained factors while
the second period was driven mainly by reduced capital formation. The scholars
calculated in the second period that “Capital effects account for 0.79 percentage point out
of the total decline of 1.12 percentage points. In this period the decline in growth of the
capital labor ratio contributes the largest effect,” which led them to conclude, “The 197378 slowdown is dominated by the effects of reduced capital formation.” 86 The middle
columns in Table 3 reveal how nearly all of the second slowdown from 1973 to 1978 was
caused by capital and labor effects.
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The committee on Economic Development in 1983 interpreted the situation
differently. The capital-labor ratio declined not because firms cut back on capital
investments but because there was a large influx of new workers into the labor market.
Nonetheless, the Committee agreed capital stock became an important economic
indicator: “The evidence suggests that the role of capital formation – that is, the increase
in new plant and equipment – was relatively unimportant before 1973 but probably did
become significant during the second phase [1973-78].” 87 Review of the literature
suggests capital accumulation affected each industry differently because of differences in
capital intensiveness, leading researchers to claim insufficient capital formation was only
a partial cause of the productivity slowdown.
Fourthly, monetary policy further depressed labor productivity, prolonged the
1979 recession, and shifted financial policy priorities away from productivity, wages, and
capital formation towards controlling inflation. Sar Levitan and Diane Werneke
proclaimed, “The key feature of the post-1973 economy was accelerating inflation.” 88
High energy costs, rising food prices, and stagnating wage growth depressed the
purchasing power of working families. Additionally, restrictive policies implemented by
the Federal Reserve caused interest rates to soar and aggregate demand to decrease,
worsening productivity growth and stifling GDP growth. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker and U.S. Treasury Secretary William Miller in 1980 admitted efforts to reduce
inflation would result in a decrease in the real purchasing power working Americans. In a

Productivity Policy: Key to the Nation’s Economic Future, Committee for Economic Development,
1983, 32.
88
Levitan and Werneke, Productivity: Problems, Prospects, and Policies, 37.
87

P a g e | 50
report to President Carter in 1980, Miller believed “long-term reductions in inflation will
have to come from reduced growth in wages, salaries.” 89 Policy priorities within both the
Carter and Reagan Administrations, influenced by growing inflation, abandoned
traditional Keynesian policy solutions for monetary policy to rein in inflation. “By
limiting the growth of money, the Fed made wage increases impossible and raised
unemployment rates. At the same time, high interest rates and subdued demand hobbled
industry requiring capital to improve the anemic productivity that Volcker had fingered
as critical.” 90 Short-run policy responses to combat inflation hindered the long-term
growth outlook for the United States. Other nations, on the other hand, were able to
weather the inflation storm without experiencing significant productivity growth declines
and rising unemployment like the United States. In this manner, international competition
and policy responses by lawmakers led to the crumbling of America’s hegemony over
market competition and productive competitiveness.

Supply-Side: Entrance of Baby-boomers and Women
A popular explanation by labor economists for the decline in labor productivity in
the 1970s was the result of demographic changes in the U.S. labor market, specifically
the entrance of the “baby-boom” generation (born 1946-64) and women into the
workforce. From 1950 to 1980, the American labor force increased by more than 44
million workers – a 70 percent increase. More than half of these new workers entered the
market during the 1970s. 91 The argument follows that the entrance of youth and women
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into the labor force dragged down overall labor productivity for the country because of
their relative inexperience: “The substantial inflow of less-experienced workers into the
labor market during the same period when inequality began to increase led some analysts
to suggest that changes in labor supply were the primary causal factor.” 92 The majority of
the baby-boomers reached working age by 1965, and the ratio of women in the workforce
rose dramatically in the 1970s. Following classical economic theory, an increase in the
supply of labor should lead to decreases in overall wages.
According to Ronald Kutscher, Jerome Mark, and John Norsworthy of the BLS
(1977), the entrance of women and youth into the labor force in the late 1960s and early
1970s led to the decrease in the output per man-hour. “Output per man-hour tends to be
relatively low among women and among new entrants into the labor force.” 93 The
Council of Economic Advisors in 1979 estimated demographic shifts accounted for a 0.4
percent decline in productivity from 1968 to 1973 and 0.3 percent from 1973 to 1979. 94
Its claims of causality are far from conclusive, however. Cross-country comparisons by
David Bloom, Richard Freeman, and Sanders Korenman (1987) on wage premiums
indicated the large increase in cohort size in the United States played a minimal role in
reducing wages for young workers and women. 95
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Figure 13. Growth in real value of wages, each decile relative to 1973 value

(Source: Morris and Western, 627)
In fact, real wages for women increased during the 1970s and 1980s while real
wages for men fell. The gender-pay gap decreased, revealing the increase in the supply of
women in the workforce clearly did not suppress their wages. Inequalities between sexes
decreased, but inequality grew rapidly within sex. According to Martina Morris and
Bruce Western, the 90:10 earnings ratio for men increased from 3.6 to 4.4 from 1980 to
1996 while the ratio for women grew from 2.9 to 4.0. Real wages for women increased,
but the relative earnings inequality within sex increased: “the sharp polarization in
earnings among women, as among men, made it clear that the benefits of this new era
were going to be distributed more unequally than before.” 96 The demographic shift of
young workers and women into the workforce is not considered by scholars to be a
significant contributor to productivity declines that occurred in the early 1970s.
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Greater women’s participation in the workforce and entrance of baby boomers
had a minimal impact on earnings inequality. Richard Easterlin (1980) speculated the
dramatic increase in the supply of inexperienced workers would depress the overall
wages of less-skilled labor, subsequently widening the relative wage gap by lowering
wages at the bottom of the distribution. 97 The flaw in Easterlin’s supply-side explanation
is the assumption about the human capital of these two demographics. First, even though
young persons and women were inexperienced in terms of years of labor experience, they
entered the labor market with a much higher level of educational attainment than the
national average. Second, there are issues in measuring productivity because of the
difficulty to discern the influence of labor market discrimination. “Because wages are
used as an approximation of productivity, the lower rates paid to women may reflect pay
discrimination rather than lower productivity.” 98 In this context, lower wages for women
concerns discrimination based on sex rather than an actual difference in labor
productivity.
Figure 13 shows the increase in stability of earnings for women at all deciles of
the earnings distribution. Rising income inequality within sex along with overall rising
real wages for women led Morris and Western to believe other economic factors are to
blame for causing inequality: “To the extent that both men’s and women’s earnings
distributions reflected the same residual polarizing trend, rising earnings inequality could
not be explained by the changing sex composition of the labor force.” 99 A rise in the
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supply of labor is expected to cause decreases in wages, but the application of the basic
theory fails when placed in the context of the data. The wage disparity between men and
women still exists today, but relative incomes for women made modest gains from 1963
to 1987.

Demand-Side: Education, Skill, & Industry
Individual educational attainment became an increasingly important factor in
wage determination because the demand for skilled labor increased steadily from the
1970s to 1990s. Political economists Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison (1988)
assessed the rise in low-wage employment in the United States. America during the postwar era was considered the “Great Jobs Machine,” but what were the quality of the jobs?
The U.S. labor market in the 1960s experienced a dramatic drop in the share of low-wage
employment, decreasing from 21.4 percent of the labor force in 1963 to 12.5 percent in
1970. The percentage share rises in the late 1970s eventually reaching 17.2 percent by
1986 (Figure 14). 100 The two economists rule out the influence of business cycles and the
entrance of the baby boom generation and women into the labor force as reasons for the
proliferation of low-wage labor. The shift to low-wage employment, according to
Bluestone and Harrison, was the result of a combination of factors such as industry shifts
from manufacturing to service, a decline in union membership, erosion of the real value
of the minimum wage, and other factors.
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Figure 14. U.S. Low-Wage Employment Share, 1963-86

(Source, Bluestone and Harrison, 126.)
Economists Lawrence Katz and Kevin Murphy (1992) analyzed changes in the
U.S. wage structure using a simple supply and demand framework. Their research led to
three findings: a sharp rise in the relative earnings of college graduates from 1963 to
1987, average wages of older workers increased relative to young workers for those with
lower levels of education, and earnings inequality increased within narrowly-defined
demographics and skill groups. 101 The authors indicate the labor environment shifted in
favor more-educated, more-skilled labor: “We conclude that rapid secular growth in the
relative demand for ‘more-skilled’ workers is a key component of any consistent
explanation for rising inequality and changes in the wage structure over the last 25
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years.” 102 Katz and Murphy agree with the general consensus: the rise in the earnings gap
is mainly the result of a steady rise in demand for highly-skilled workers at the same time
low-wage labor began to proliferate, leaving minimal agency for low-skilled workers.
Figure 15. Indexed real weekly wages for men by percentile, 1963-89

(Source: Juhn, et. al., 416)
Chinhui Juhn, Kevin Murphy, and Brooks Pierce (1993) researched wage
differentials and observable skills. Figure 15 graphs the tenth, median, and ninetieth
percentiles of real weekly wages for men from 1963 to 1989. For the lower 10th
percentile of earners, real wages increased by 20 percent from 1963 to 1970 and then
declined by 25 percent from 1970 until 1989. While the real wages for the 90th percentile
steadily increased all the way through to 1989: “After about two and one-half decades,
workers in the top 10 percent of the wage distribution have gained almost 40 percent,
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whereas workers in the bottom 10 percent have lost over 5 percent in real terms.” 103 What
caused this significant disconnect between real wage growth between top earners and low
earners? During the 1960s and 1970s, the supply of educated workers increased
dramatically. Theoretically, an increase in the supply of labor should correspond with
decreases in wages for that demographic, yet the wage premium for highly-educated
workers remained high. Contrary to traditional economic theory, wages for educated
workers remained high in spite of an increase in the supply of educated workers because
demand for skilled labor increased. From the data, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce concluded
the demand for skill increased from 1963 to 1989. 104 The shift in demand for high-skilled
workers and low-skilled workers is a significant cause for the rise in wage and income
inequality.
Figure 16. College Wage Premium, 1963 to 1993

(Source: Gottschalk, “Inequality, Income Growth, and Mobility,” 31)
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The earnings gap between college and high school graduates has more than
doubled in the United States over the past three decades. Figure 16 plots the college wage
premium – the coefficient showing how much more a college graduate makes than a high
school graduate holding all else constant. The graph shows how the college premium
remained steady in the 1960s, declined during the 1970s, then increased dramatically in
the 1980s. By 1993, the college premium was 53 percent. Per Gottschalk, the increase in
earnings inequality was caused by two opposing processes: the increase in relative wages
for more educated and experienced workers and a sharp decline in the real wages of lessskilled workers. Later work by Gottschalk and Robert Moffitt (2009) stressed the
implications of the economic burden concentrated on lower-skilled workers: “That the
increase was concentrated in the lower-skilled portion of the population should raise
concerns about whether consumption and well-being in that portion of the population that
has been adversely affected.” 105 The implications of personal well-being will be
discussed further in the conclusion.
Figure 17. Supply of college graduates and the U.S. college wage premium, 1963-2012

(Source: Autor, “Skills, education, and the rise of earnings inequality…,” 846)
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Economist David Autor (2014) researched the growth in the wage premium and
decreases in economic mobility for low-skilled workers. Figure 17 shows two graphs.
The left graph depicts the increase in the number of college-educated workers through a
rising college share of hours worked from 1963 to 2012. The right graph depicts the same
data as Figure 16 but adds additional data for years 1993 to 2012. During that period, the
college wage premium continued to rise to exceed 95 percent in 2012. “In the United
States, about two-thirds of the overall rise of earnings dispersion between 1980 and 2005
is proximately accounted for by the increased premium associated with schooling in
general and postsecondary education,” Autor claims. 106 Based on the data, economists
developed the “education race” model which argues earnings of educated and skilled
workers will continue to increase so long as the supply of educated labor continues to fall
behind the continual outward shifts in the demand for skills. 107
Figure 18. Changes in real wages of full-time U.S. workers
by sex and education, 1963-2012

(Source: Autor, “Skills, education, and the rise of earnings inequality…,” 849)
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The increasing earnings gap is not only due to relative increases in earnings for
college-educated workers but also because of a decrease in the real earnings of noncollege educated workers. The left graph in Figure 18 shows the real earnings of men
based on education level from 1963 to 2012. Real earnings for males with a high school
degree or less decreased by 22% among dropouts and 11% among high school graduates,
while real earnings for those with a college degree or more increased from 20% to 56%
with the highest returns to those with post-baccalaureate degrees. The right graph shows
modest gains in real earnings among women, although relative wages compared to men
remains high. 108
Figure 19. Earnings inequality and economic mobility: cross-national relationships

(Source: Autor, “Skills, education, and the rise of earnings inequality…,” 849)
Autor’s cross-country analysis of earnings mobility to provides international
context for the case of the United States. His findings reveal intergenerational mobility in
the United States is relatively low. The left graph in Figure 19 shows the proportional
relationship between cross-sectional inequality and earnings mobility of 13 OECD
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countries. Where there is more income inequality, there is less economic mobility. The
right graph in Figure 19 shows the relationship between earnings mobility and a
country’s college wage premium for men. The proportional relationship reveals countries
with high “returns to skill” often have the lowest mobility. The striking conclusion from
the study is the United States has the lowest mobility and highest inequality out of the 13
OECD countries. 109
Technological change through automation eliminated employment opportunities
in production, clerical, and administrative support positions that were substituted with
cheaper technological alternatives. David Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane
(2003) assessed the shift in employee tasks and its impact on labor demand. The authors
claim computerization acted as a substitute for routine labor but a complement to workers
who performed nonroutine problem-solving tasks: “within industries, occupations, and
education groups, computerization is associated with reduced labor input of routine
manual and routine cognitive tasks and increased labor input of nonroutine cognitive
tasks.” The authors attribute 60% of the demand shift favoring college labor to the task
changes within occupations from 1970 to 1998. 110 Improvements in technology in the
workplace overall produced a net benefit for educated and skilled workers and a net
negative for less-skilled labor.
Labor economist Alan Krueger (1993) published a significant article on whether
employees who used computers at work earned a higher wage as a consequence of their
computer use and skills. His data research concluded “employees who directly use a
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computer at work earn a 10 to 15 percent higher wage rate…the estimates imply that the
proliferation of computers can account for between one-third and one-half of the increase
in the rate of return to education observed between 1984 and 1989.” 111 Although one
explanation is unlikely to account for the entire change in the wage structure, Krueger
argued technological change – specifically the use of computers –contributed to changes
in the wage structure.
Two notable sociologists, Tali Kritsol and Yinon Cohen (2014, 2016), differed
from Krueger and presented an explanation known as Skill-Biased Technological Change
(SBTC). “Instead we posit for complex dynamics between computerization and fading
pay-setting institutions, arguing that the latter is a mechanism by which the former
operates.” 112 The most striking implication of Kristol and Cohen’s research is that
computerization reduced labor share of income and “indirectly by exacerbating union
decline.” 113 Computers improved automation in the production process, eliminating many
manual, mostly unionized laborers. In effect, computers had a polarizing effect on the
wage structure. Technological change hurt blue-collar workers directly by eliminating
employment opportunities and indirectly by eroding the leverage of wage setting
institutions. Prior studies suggest computers allowed skilled-workers to experience “upskilling” while manual laborers experienced “de-skilling.”
Technological change restructured demands in the U.S. labor market during the
1970s to1990s in favor of more educated, higher-skilled workers while it decreased its
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demand for low-skilled workers. Douglas Massey and Deborah Hirst (1998) described
the shift in the U.S. wage structure as a movement “From Escalator to Hourglass,” where
the economy offered high wage jobs for people with advanced educations, low wage jobs
for people with minimal schooling, and relatively little job in the middle for people with
average educational attainment:
“By 1989, male workers face a difficult socioeconomic ladder that increasingly
lacks the middle rungs. Examination of occupational wage distributions…reveals
that the hourglass is actually a composite of a pyramid for high school dropouts,
an inverted pyramid for college graduates, and an hourglass for high school
graduates. Thus, one’s position in the new hourglass economy depends very much
on one’s educational attainment.” 114
Human capital, reflected through years of educational attainment, became an increasingly
important variable in determining estimated income projections. Furthermore, economic
mobility became increasingly difficult in the United States. Lack of upward mobility has
led to the development of generational inequalities, where a child born poor is likely to
stay poor and a child born rich is likely to stay rich. The life chances of American
children are becoming more and more associated with the educational attainment of their
parents and guardians.

Deindustrialization & Globalization: from Stakeholders to Shareholders
The rise of low-wage employment in the United States is often associated with the
complex and controversial processes of globalization and deindustrialization in post-
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industrial societies. The negative effects of international competition and labor shifts are
taken into consideration for causing the slow decay of the manufacturing sector, the rise
of the service sector, and a new wage structure offering relatively lower paying jobs in
industries with less security and benefits. The U.S. economy post-1973 experienced
systematic disinvestment in domestic manufacturing industries such as auto, steel, and
machinery. Researchers generally link the outsourcing of higher paying manufacturing
jobs out of the United States during the 1970s to 1990s with the growing forces of
globalization. Globalization is commonly defined by two key economic features:
increasing financial links between countries through trade, capital flows, and direct
investments, and the growing influence of transnational corporations. The two processes
caused structural shifts in the U.S. economy, employment, and income distribution. This
section will cover the shift from manufacturing to service, financialization of the
nonfinance sector, decline of unions, monetarism and the dismantling of the welfare state,
and the rise of super-managers.
According to the deindustrialization hypothesis, “changes in industrial structure
directly caused distributional changes” in workers’ incomes. Increases in foreign
competition pressured firms to uproot domestic sites and transport them aboard. Sheldon
Danziger and Peter Gottschalk (1995) revealed how the decline in manufacturing
employment corresponded with rising income inequality: “Inequality increased as
manufacturing declined from about 30 percent to about 20 percent of the workforce
between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s.” 115 The popular argument about the American
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labor market during the 1980s was “there were fewer jobs for auto workers and more jobs
for ‘hamburger flippers,’” and the data supports this conclusion. 116 The economists
caution, however, shifts between industries only played a small role in rising inequality;
the data also revealed inequality increased within industries. Eli Berman, John Bound,
and Zvi Griliches (1994) researched the shift away from unskilled to skilled labor within
U.S. manufacturing in the 1980s and concluded that changes in the industrial structure
contributed little to inequality. The shift in demand for more-skilled workers was rather
the result of “biased technological change” reflecting “skill upgrading” within industry
standards that caused increased inequality within industries more so than between
them. 117 In essence, deindustrialization’s effects on the U.S. wage structure benefited the
skilled and educated while it diminished the real standard of living for lower-skilled
workers.
The globalization hypothesis, on the other hand, argues increased foreign
competition and the rise in the consumption of imported goods decreased the demand for
American-made goods. As a result, the decrease in demand for American goods caused a
decrease in the demand for the labor needed to produce those goods, consequently
leading to decreases in domestic wages and employment. Simultaneously, firms moved
capital and jobs overseas. In order for American firms to compete against cheap foreign
labor, less-skilled U.S. workers had to accept lower wages in order for firms to make up
for a relative disadvantage in productivity. Globalization connects directly with income
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inequality because the process – similar to deindustrialization – increased wages for
more-skilled workers while it devasted less-skilled workers who experienced reductions
in wages and job losses: “Many such jobs disappeared altogether as firms ‘outsourced’
the production of components to foreign subsidiaries. Good jobs for less-educated
workers disappeared, while high-skilled jobs for workers…proliferated.” 118 The
globalization hypothesis presents a clear case of rising inequality and a decay in the
standard of living for low-skilled and less-educated Americans.
Figure 20. Share of total nonfarm employment in service and goods producing sectors,
1950-1997

(Source: Morris and Western, 637)
Deindustrialization is the result of demand-side labor factors, and the process is
commonly associated with the substitution of “good” jobs with “bad” jobs. The new
service sector jobs paid less on average relative to the former manufacturing jobs, offered
fewer benefits, and included more part-time employment. “The restructuring took two
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forms: continuing decline in manufacturing employment leading to the emergence of a
‘service economy,’ and the rise in market-mediated employment relations – outsourcing,
subcontracting, and temporary, contingent, and part-time work contracts.” 119 Workers
accustomed to the benefits, job security, and labor relations of factory work transitioned
into industries offering nothing of the sort. Figure 20 shows the employment shares
between the service and goods producing sector from 1950 to 1997 from 1998 BLS data.
During the span of this period, the share of employment in the manufacturing industry
declined by 15% while the share of the service sector increased 29%. Morris and Western
cite work from Bluestone and argue the shift from manufacturing to service is a
significant cause for wage stagnation for low-skilled workers. 120 Figure 21 reveals the
inverse correlation between increases in employment by industry and the industry’s
average weekly earnings. The two lowest wage industries – retail and services –
experienced the largest increases in employment while the highest paying industries
experienced the smallest changes in employment. 121
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Figure 21. Median weekly earnings by industry relative to growth in employment
in that industry, 1972-1996

(Source: Morris and Western, 637)
Bluestone and Harrison’s 1982 work, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant
Closings, Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, claimed capital mobility
played the largest role in causing deindustrialization. Bluestone and Harrison argued
deindustrialization occurred because firms reprioritized short-term profits and cash
management over domestic production and investment. Due to the effects of the profit
squeeze of the late 1960s, pressures to increase profits shifted incentives of business
managers away from development to quarterly profits. The formation of a purely
financial lens made firms distance themselves from honoring previous labor social
contracts. For example, the economists claim it became popular for firms to close
operations for the sake of producing a larger profit margin by quarter’s end even if the
operations were productive and efficient. 122

Bennet Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings,
Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
122

P a g e | 69
Neil Fligstein (1990) in The Transformation of Corporate Control provided an
institutional analysis of how America’s largest corporations have shaped the functioning
of the economy since the early twentieth century. Fligstein’s main argument is business
managers over the twentieth century consciously implemented “conceptions of control”
meant to manipulate economic dogma in the workforce. Instead of firms responding to
trends in markets, the economic strategies of firms drove the market. By the late 1970s,
prioritizing production and investment became an obsolete guideline for evaluating a
firm’s public financial standing: “The finance conception of control continues to
dominate the world of large firms today. The short-run performance of the largest firms
measures their efficacy…the single most important goal of modern corporate life is
keeping the stock price above the book value of the firm.” 123 Fligstein believes business
managers are flawed in their promotion and practice of this ideology: “The central
argument I propose here is that managers rarely know what is economically efficient.” 124
Efficiency was no longer about productivity growth, research and development, and
implementing best-practice technologies. Instead, “The world of top managers is now
more concerned with the firm’s position in the stock market and with its accounting
records. The finance conception evaluates the consequence of any course of action in
purely financial terms.” 125 In other words, business managers in the 1970s prioritized the
tertiary economy (finance) over the secondary economy (physical goods and the workers
that make them). Fligstein is referring to the financialization of the U.S. economy.
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Figure 22. Financial income over realized profits, 1970-2007

(Source: Ken-Hou Lin and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, 1287)
Ken-Hou Lin and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) assessed the link between
the financialization of the U.S. economy and the rise in income inequality. Their research
shows nonfinance firms since the 1980s have increased their reliance on revenue through
financial channels like capital gains. Greater reliance on revenue through finance, the
authors argue, created a rift between labor and capital which diminished negotiating
leverage for average workers relative to managers and elites:
“the increasing reliance on income through financial channels restructured the
social relations and the income dynamics in the nonfinance sector. Substituting
production and sales investment with financial investment decoupled the
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generation surplus from production, strengthening owners’ and elite workers’
negotiating power against other workers.” 126
A greater reliance on revenue from financial streams reduced the labor share of income
among less-skilled industry workers. The authors refute the legitimacy of the marginal
productivity thesis for wage determination because of financialization’s disproportionate
funneling of income and power to managers and elites. The growing dependence on
revenue through financial channels “accentuates the social divides between capital and
labor and between management and general workers,” the authors claim. 127 Figure 22
shows how financial income – defined as interest, dividends, and capital gains – steadily
became a larger portion of revenue for U.S. corporations since 1970. In this context,
firms no longer relied as heavily on production and sales for revenue created by their
workforce. Consequently, the relationship management and labor deteriorated from its
prior state.
The decline of union strength and collective bargaining power followed the rise of
financialization. In 1970, unions represented roughly 27% of all wage and salary earners
in the United States. Twenty-three years later in 1993, the unionization rate decreased
nearly in half to 15%. The effect of union representation decline “fell most sharply
among men, in the private sector, and in manufacturing industries.” 128 Martina Morris
and Bruce Western (1999) noted the existence of a corollary relationship between the
decline in union percentage of the labor share and the increase in income inequality.
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Figure 23 shows how private sector union density in the U.S. decreased by approximately
70% from 1970 to 2011, decreasing from 24% of the workforce to 7%. 129
Figure 23. Public and Private Sector Union Membership, 1956-2016

(Source: Brookings, “Thirteen Facts about Wage Growth,” 6)
Richard Freeman (1991) researched the estimated effect of changing union
density of the American workforce on earnings differentials among male workers. “I
estimate the contribution of falling unionism to the increased white collar/blue collar and
college/high school wage differentials and the rise in the overall variance in earnings.” 130
His empirical analysis concluded the fall in union density contributed to increases in
earnings inequality in the 1980s, where “40 to 50 percent of the rise in white-collar
premium and 15 to 40 percent of the rise in the college premium” are attributable to the
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decline in union share of the labor force. 131 Morris and Western’s (1999) review of the
findings concluded the decline in union density accounted for roughly 20% of the overall
rise in wage inequality for males and as much as 50% for blue collar workers. 132 Analysis
of 43 US industries between 1964 and 2012 by Kristal and Cohen (2016) concluded the
decline of unions and the fall in the real value of the minimum wage account for 50% of
rising income inequality while the effects of computerization account for another 25%.
Unions declined in part because the job makeup shifted away from unionized industries
like manufacturing to the service industry which offered less opportunities for collective
bargaining. 133
The three studies conclude the decline in union influence is attributable to roughly
half of the rising income inequality among male workers. Globalization of the production
process increased international competition and placed stress on U.S. manufacturing
firms in the 1970s, leading to the erosion of union membership and the capability for
unions to negotiate favorable contracts. Analyzing the relationship between
deindustrialization and trade union decline, Christopher Kollmeyer (2018) raised a
critical point about the ideological shift that took place in the 1980s towards labor. The
demise of Keynesianism caused by shifting attention away from managing
unemployment to inflation “partially reflects the exigencies of globalization…which care
greatly about sound money but much less about joblessness.” 134 Global competition
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overturned previously held understandings about economics, giving rise to an antigovernment, anti-labor ideology opposed to any government action to address economic
externalities.
Disillusionment from the economic chaos of the 1970s challenged traditional
understandings of macroeconomic relationships. The demise of Keynesianism in the
1970s is attributable to changes in management culture and policy responses a short-term
economic recession. Its impact in the long-run, on the other hand, led to the dismantling
of the traditional relationship between labor and management. Bennett Harrison and
Barry Bluestone (1988), in The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the
Polarizing of America, detail the 180-degree turn in the relationship between business
and the workforce, financialization, and a shift in the role of the federal government in
supporting the short-term endeavors of private business and away from the interests of
working families. The market shocks of the 1970s, OPEC oil price increases, wage and
inflationary pressures significantly “squeezed” the profit rates of American firms in the
1970s. Before the influence of international competition, additional profits could be made
through raising prices. The practice of “mark-up pricing” functioned well as American
consumers bought American goods. Once foreign goods came into the equation,
however, the mark-up strategy became obsolete: “Unable to raise prices at will, having
lost control over the cost of resources and capital, and unskilled at designing or producing
quality goods, American corporations were left with a limited number of ways to regain
their list profits.” 135 Corporate managers were presented with three options, the authors
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claim: leave the producing end of business and find another venture, “zap” labor to
control costs, or attempt to influence the government to reduce their taxes. American
corporations did all three. 136 More specifically, businesses gravitated toward adopting
what Robert Reich termed “paper entrepreneurialism” that transformed fundamental
business values away from stakeholder superiority to shareholder primacy. 137
Modern management’s most important criterion for business success became
short-term shareholder value maximization. Robert Hayes and William Abernathy’s
(1980) influential article in the Harvard Business Review, “Managing Our Way to
Economic Decline,” argued corporate managers in America abandoned investments in
innovative products and best-practice technology to secure long-term market share.
Instead of competing in the marketplace through technological competition and superior
products, American firms increased their reliance on revenue through financial ventures
like mergers, acquisitions, and a greater reliance on the stock market. The scholars warn,
“These new principles…encourage a preference for (1) analytic detachment rather than
the insight that from ‘hands on’ experience and (2) short-term cost reduction rather than
long-term development of technological competitiveness. It is this new managerial
gospel, we feel, that has played a major role in undermining the vigor of American
industry.” 138 Instead of competing for productive superiority like Japan and Germany,
American corporations made the conscious decision to shift towards gaining revenue
through financial markets and less from the labor market. Over time, consequently, labor
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turned into a cost containment problem incentivizing managers to “zap” labor costs
(wages, benefits, full-time employment) to appease shareholders. 139 What followed can
be summarized as the globalization of production, union busting, freezing wages, and the
increase in part-time employment which hollowed traditional labor standards in the
United States.
The ideological void left by the economic instability and a lack of adequate policy
responses by national policymakers in the 1970s gave rise to a rejuvenated form of
liberalism. Unlike the classical nineteenth century interpretation of liberalism, the new
ideological paradigm was not focused so much on freedoms for individuals – although it
was self-described as such – as it was about freedoms for corporations and private
entities. Daniel Rodgers in Age of Fracture (2011) uncovered how semantics changed the
economic ideology of the American public: “In an age when words took on magical
properties, no word flew higher or assumed a greater aura of enchantment than
‘market’…It stood for a way of thinking about society with a myriad of self-generated
actions for its engine and optimization as its natural and spontaneous outcome.” 140 The
1980s vision of the “market” reflected a renewed version of Adam Smith’s notion of the
invisible hand. “Whereas governments, it was said, moved by coercion and deliberative
politics stumbled though concession and compromise, the market was held out as the
realm of freedom, choice, and reason.” 141 People were looking for solutions to the
economic problems of the 1970s while policy leaders floundered the situation, leading to
the upending of economic dogma in the country.
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Confidence and faith in the market as a metaphorical ideal was not the product of
economic growth and prosperity but of instability and chaos. “The puzzle of the era’s
enchantment of the market idea is that it was born not out of success but out of such
striking market failure…The economic crisis of the 1970s was, in short, not merely a
crisis in management. It was also, and at least as painfully, a crisis in ideas and
intellectual authority.” 142 Conservative academics, lawmakers, and pundits in the 1980s
seized the opportunity and adopted the effective semantics used by Milton Friedman in
Capital and Freedom (1962). Friedman’s vision of the marketplace as a metaphorical
concept associated the terms “coercion” and “compulsory” with any government action
while attributing “freedom” and “enterprise” and “choice” with the powers of the market.
The proper role of the government according to Friedman was to provide citizens with
personal security along with certainty in the marketplace. “The role of government just
considered is to do something that the market cannot do for itself, namely, to determine,
arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game.” 143 Friedman believed the proliferation of
monopolies to be the prominent issue in which government action was warranted, for
monopolies limited choice and prohibited competition. His view of limited government
that prioritized the protection of property rights and the maintenance of business
competition has often been misconstrued over the decades in later neoliberal
publications. 144 For example, Friedman conceded the need for government
(“compulsory”) action in order to address issues in the distribution of income: “there is a
clear justification for social action of a very different kind than taxation to affect the
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distribution of income. Much of the actual inequalities derives from imperfections in the
market…There is every reason to adjust to the rules of the game so as to eliminate these
sources of inequality.” 145 Under Friedman’s ideology, the government possessed minimal
avenues to address market imperfections that did not violate his ideological principle of
the role of government in a free society.
Other scholars in line with Friedman’s thinking adopted and furthered his
principles about the role of government. Authors such as Mancur Olson, William Fellner,
Tibor Scitovksy, and Herbert Giersch argued the institutional means of government
intervention were the main causes for stifling growth in the 1970s. 146 According to these
scholars, the proper prescription for greater labor market participation, savings, and
consumption was broad tax cuts, deregulation of business and capital flows, and the
elimination of social and anti-poverty programs. Under this agenda, neoliberal
economists such as Arthur Laffer, Paul Craig Roberts, and David Stockman became
labeled as “supply-siders” focused on monetarism: “Monetarism offered a strikingly
simple rule for hard times: let the money supply be prudently managed and markets
would provide the rest.” 147 Institutional factors such as unions, welfare programs, and
food stamps for the poor became viewed as the source of economic problems and not the
solution. The rise of neoliberalism in this context laid the intellectual groundwork that
justified the destruction of social democratic institutions within the United States. Based
on five decades of income statistics, the implementation of the neoliberal agenda catered
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 176.
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); William Fellner, “The Declining Growth of American
Productivity: An Introductory Note,” in Contemporary Economic Problems, 1979 (Washington, D.C.,
1979).
147
Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture, 54.
145
146

P a g e | 79
tax legislation disproportionately to the top decile and top percentile of income earners –
the so called “job creators” – with the belief funds would eventually trickle down in the
form of wages and further economic activity after top income earners reinvest their
additional untaxed income. The institutional changes greatly benefited managers and
corporate executives but created tremendous instability for average working Americans:
“While such changes in work organization may provide ‘flexibility’ for management,
they tend to bring with them increased instability and insecurity for employees.” 148 The
rediscovery of the market greatly benefited those in business management and high
finance under the notion that forms of aggregate collectivism squandered the growth
mechanisms of the market.
With the most contemporary explanation, economist Thomas Picketty attributed
the rise of income inequality to the special treatment of those above the top percentile of
the income distribution through favorable tax policies – who he classifies as
“supermanagers.” Picketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2010) claimed the rise
of the supermanger is mainly an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon in the United States, Canada,
Great Britain, and Australia. Figure 24, 25, and 26 show the income share of the top
decile in Anglo-Saxon countries relative to continental Europe and Japan, revealing a
striking difference between the two geographic groups. Based on these statistics, Picketty
highlighted how the United States stands out from the rest as the greatest outlier in terms
of the supermanager phenomenon. “If the rise of the supermanager were a purely
technological phenomenon, it would be difficult to understand why such large differences
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exist between otherwise quite similar countries.” 149 In this context, the factors causing the
top decile and percentile to receive disproportionately greater income gains in America
has more to do than technology and globalization but also business culture and
institutional factors.
Figure 24: Share of top percentile of Anglo-Saxon countries, 1910-2010

Figure 25: Share of top percentile in Continental Europe and Japan, 1910-2010
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Figure 26: Income share of top percentile Northern and Southern Europe, 1910-2010

(Source: Picketty, 316-318)
Assessing income distribution in the United States over the past five decades,
Picketty reaffirmed the inability of the marginal productivity theory to explain the
disproportionate share of income accruing at the top level of the income distribution:
“this quite large divergence in the way the income distribution has evolved in the various
wealthy countries demands an explanation, which the theory of marginal productivity and
the race between technology and education does not seem capable of providing.” 150 The
structural shifts of the 1970s led to the development of an economic system with a trend
of increasing inequality with no projections of it slowing down. Lack of social mobility
and increased income inequality have economic and social repercussions, yet the field of
economics has generally disregarded the opportunity costs of an alternative labor
structure that alters the distribution of income more equitably to workers while
stimulating economic growth in the process.
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Conclusion
A New Economic Paradigm
“What, then, of the contemporary belief that we can either have benevolent social
service states or efficient, growth-generating free markets but not both?” 151
Three major economic forces – technological change, deindustrialization, and
globalization – dramatically altered the job structure in the U.S. economy over the past
half-century. The foremost concern raised by the evidence is the economic and social
implications of declining real earnings for low-skilled workers, less opportunities for
socioeconomic mobility, and decreasing agency for workers in the economy. As David
Autor (2014) states, “These declines in both earnings and employment bode ill for the
welfare of non-college-educated U.S. adults and are likely to have broader detrimental
social consequences…greater criminality, increased social dependency, and (more
mundanely) reduced tax receipts.” 152 Researchers have tracked rising wage and income
inequality in the United States for decades. Politicians have had ample time to address the
issue, yet the trend of increasing income inequality has continued. The contemporary
paradigm within the field of economics – with its foundational principles rooted in
neoliberalism – lacks a fundamental assessment of the moral implications of its theories,
assumptions, and prescriptions regarding the best route to economic efficiency and progrowth public policy.
There are five main conclusions about the origins of wage and income inequality
in the United States. First, it is an unequivocal fact that income inequality – the earnings
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gap between the rich and the poor – has increased since 1973. Second, American workers
today have less economic agency to bargain and receive proportional compensation
relative to workers during the golden age. Deregulatory efforts such as the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 caused wealth to accumulate to those who
held financial assets and permitted incentives for market concentration through mergers
and acquisitions. Lack of anti-trust enforcement and financial deregulation created an
ideological foundation for the acceptance and promotion of monopolistic and
monopsonistic tendencies under the guise of a “free” market that repressed competition,
resulting in the third conclusion: shareholder primacy. Financialization shifted attention
away from productivity growth and the secondary economy (physical goods and workers)
towards the tertiary economy (assets and capital flows) in order to replace the lost
revenue from increased international competition. The paradigm created a society “in
which firms have been merged and acquired, downsized, deindustrialized,
multinationalized, automated, streamlined, and restructured.” 153 The purpose of a
corporation was no longer to provide a service in the most efficient and effective way
possible in hopes of profit. The purpose of a corporation is to provide returns for
shareholders.
In order to maintain profit margins and returns for shareholders, labor became a
cost containment problem. Wage increases – formerly viewed as an economic positive
because of money velocity theory – are instead actions that would kill jobs, put
companies out of business, and cause inflation. “For the last thirty years, when asking
ourselves whether we support a policy, a proposal or an initiative, we have restricted
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ourselves to issues of profit and loss – economic questions in the narrowest sense. But
this is not an instinctive human condition: it is an acquired taste.” 154 Shareholder primacy
decreases the importance of worker priorities to corporate managers such as wage
increases, healthcare, leave, and other benefits. American business’s lens towards
“zapping” labor, laden with skewed simplifying assumptions, has remained the
contemporary economic dogma of the past sixty years. There needs to be more
democracy in the workplace and more support for workers’ ability to organize and utilize
collective leverage to obtain adequate compensation.
Fourth, educational attainment has become a critical factor for income
determination. There is fierce debate about whether higher education provides workers
with measurable skills or, as some research suggests, college degrees act more as a
signaling mechanism for firms to filter potential applicants. 155 Regardless, evidence
reveals sizeable returns to further educational attainment. Since technological innovation
is no longer an avenue for productivity growth and subsequent wage growth, the most
viable and feasible avenue to increase wages for lower-skilled individuals is additional
investments in public education and job training programs. Wharton economist Peter
Cappelli (2012) in Why Good People Can’t Get Jobs: The Skills Gap and What
Companies Can Do About it addressed the complex situation with job mismatch. The
problem with the labor market and hiring, according to Cappelli, is a disconnect in the
hiring process in which firms demand a range of expectations that Cappelli believes to be
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far-fetched for the positions advertised. In other instances, firms are simply not offering
competitive wages for open positions. 156 There is a need for further investigation into the
general culture of human resource departments and how best to match workers where
their skills can be utilized in jobs which provide a livable and sustainable income. “If we
are going to produce a more educated work force, then we had better be sure that jobs are
being created (or upgraded) so as to fully utilize and reward the skill and ability of that
work force…We need both re-planned education and better-planned job creation.” 157 Our
nation’s industrial policy needs to better match our public education policy, which itself
is in need of desperate reform. Investing in human capital through additional educational
attainment or job training programs is an avenue that will statistically raise the wages of
those workers; the key is ensuring the skills obtained are in demand in the labor market
and targeted toward higher paying professions.
Lastly, the field of economics since the 1980s has revered economic theory and its
folk-like wisdom the same way physical scientists interpret the laws of gravity. The key
distinction in this comparison is the underlying premise that humans have no agency in
the process. The universe – or synonymously, the market – acts in particularly ways
irrespective of human influence. The language in which neoliberal scholars since the
1970s framed the discussion about “the market” overturned the traditional Keynesian
paradigm. Governmental policy through macroeconomic “tweaks” lost appeal. Scholars
source the origin of the neoliberal paradigm to the rise of monetarism in the late 1970s as
the policy response to rising inflation. The short-term policy approach of controlling
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inflation at the cost of wage growth and employment in the long run transitioned
economic priorities of policymakers and scholars in a successful attempt “to break down
the case for macroeconomic fine-tuning, and ultimately to transfer business-cycle
management from Congress to the Council of Economic Advisors to Volcker’s heirs at
the Federal Reserve.” 158 Employment and wages fell to the wayside in place of
controlling inflation and maintaining quarterly profit margins. After the switch in the late
1970s under Carter and furthered by Reagan, there was no going back to the “old” way of
micromanagement of the macroeconomy. Policy leaders during crux of the crisis failed to
provide a substantive and concerted response to the fragmentation of American economic
hegemony in world affairs. The economic and psychological trauma of the 1970s
triggered a paradigm shift in how the American public viewed the role of corporations,
the agency of workers, and government involvement in the economy.
Semantics is the critical problem allowing for the continuation of earnings
inequality. The current diction our culture attributes to the fields of politics and
economics limits the scope of debate about the type of policy alternatives at our disposal
to improve society; the limitation is rooted in the early promoters of the newly
interpreted, unfettered “market.” In his last publication Ill Fares the Land (2010),
historian Tony Judt addressed the language attributed to markets. the long-term moral
implications of expanding income inequality, and the abandonment of social democracy:
“Much of what appears ‘natural’ today dates from the 1980s: the obsession with
wealth creation, the cult of privatization and the private sector, the growing
disparities of rich and poor. And above all, the rhetoric which accompanies these:
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uncritical admiration for unfettered markets, disdain for the public sector, and
delusion of endless growth.” 159
Contemporary scholars, pundits, and politicians metaphorically painted the “invisible
hand” as a transcendent entity that humans should not influence. This is a misconstrued
interpretation of conclusions economists originally extracted from Adam Smith’s Wealth
of Nations during the original liberalism period of the late nineteenth century. 160 As a
result of implicit biases in economic models and theoretical assumptions, many
contemporary scholars claim the forces of globalization and deindustrialization are
naturally occurring and unstoppable processes. Rising income inequality from
globalization, therefore, is what it is. Economists Suresh Naidu, Dani Rodrik, and Gabriel
Zucman (2019) highlight the problem with the field of economics in the way theory is
misconstrued to be interpreted as objective fact. According to the three economists, “The
truth is that empirical methods are always laden with assumptions, both of the formal
economic-theoretic sort and more ‘folk wisdom’-like traditions and methods,” where
researchers and the public must be conscientious of “a reflexive defense of mainstream
orthodoxy” by the industry’s most influential and powerful leaders. 161 Tony Judt follows
this sentiment and refutes the current paradigm by arguing humans have agency in the
economic process, and national leaders over decades have failed to amend the fallout
from chaos of the 1970s. Growing inequality in the long run, according to Judt,
destabilizes societal institutions and is economically inefficient. “We have entered an age
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of insecurity – economic insecurity, physical insecurity, political insecurity…Insecurity
breeds fear. And fear – fear of change, fear of decline, fear of strangers and an unfamiliar
world – is corroding the trust and interdependence on which civil societies rest.” 162 Judt
alludes to the complex social ramifications of globalization and rising inequality which
economists have failed to address.
Wages, salaries, and incomes go beyond mere labor statistics; they determine the
quality of life of working people. Future economic policy production must include an
analysis a policy’s effect on the community, public trust, and the common good: “The
only way to avoid such mistakes in the future is to re-think the criteria we employ to
assess costs of all kinds: social, environmental, human, aesthetic, and cultural as well as
economic.” 163 Economics is a science that uses models with simplifying assumptions
because it is impossible to comprehend the invariable interconnections of the actual
economy – only to view its logical progression in a metaphorical vacuum. Policymakers
of the early twenty-first century should look to the approach American leaders of the
early twentieth century. Instead of relying so much upon policy estimates using biased
methodology, Presidents Teddy Roosevelt and William Howard Taft took on oil and
railroad monopolies in the name of competition – the critical component of Milton
Friedman’s ideology that conservative thinkers have abandoned today. Along with
market interests in mind, Roosevelt and Taft identified a clear conflict with the free play
of private interests that went against the public will and intervened. Revisiting the trustbusting era and origination of the Square Deal should be a focus for future researchers.
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Taft, when pressured by special interests not to enforce anti-trust laws, became
aggravated by the manner in which the business executives pushed for further wealth at
all costs:
“…he did not place the businessman at ‘the highest pinnacle of honor and trust.’
Nor did he regard property rights as absolute, deserving precedence at every turn
over human rights. From his father he learned that the man who devoted himself
to his community…deserved greater praise than the man who pursued wealth for
its own sake. Wealth was honorable only to the extent that it contributed to the
well-being of the community.” 164
The history of research and discovery is the history of paradigm shifts in the way society
viewed itself and the world in which it existed – from science, to culture, to economics,
and so forth. Is it so radical, then, after four decades of increasing inequality, to ask for
workers to receive a fairer shake in the distribution of a firm’s earnings, and that
businesses function for the benefit of the community at large?
Conflicts arise when there is an imbalance in power between two groups, and
American workers have habitually been the party with the power dynamics stacked
against them. Intellectual leaders in economics, alongside wealthy business executives,
capitalized on an ideological void during a period of economic, social, and political
upheaval in the 1970s to press for a corporate, market-oriented interpretation of effective
and efficient economics that deprioritized labor in the success of business. The notion
that labor is a cost-containment problem, higher wages are anti-business measures, and
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the role of a corporation is only to provide returns to its shareholders is not sacrosanct
and is an ideal that has proven detrimental to the level of equality in our society. If the
American economy wants to succeed in the long-term, its workers need to receive a
larger proportion of the wealth generated by those participating in the economy.
Economics can work for everyone if people believe it can. There is a need for a new
paradigm – a paradigm of economics that works for the benefit of all.
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